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"Animus" and Moral Disapproval:
A Comment on Romer v. Evans
Barbara J. Flagg*
Romer v. Evans1 was the first "gay rights" case to reach the
U.S. Supreme Court in the decade since Bowers v. Hardwick,
2
and it already has generated nearly the same level of discus-
sion as did its predecessor, though for quite different reasons.
From the gay rights point of view, Romer reached a much more
satisfactory result than Hardwick: by a 6-3 vote the Court held
unconstitutional an amendment to the Colorado state consti-
tution ("Amendment 2") that would have prohibited the enact-
ment or enforcement of any statute, regulation, ordinance, or
policy forbidding discrimination on the basis of homosexuality.3
Moreover, Romer marks an apparent sea change in the Court's
perspective on one problem of moral community: whether and
how the state may express moral disapproval of "victimless"
private conduct-that is, conduct that causes no harm to any-
one, including the person who finds it morally objectionable,
other than the moral disapproval itself.4 Hardwick held that a
moral purpose provided adequate justification for a state's
* Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law. I thank
Kathy Goldwasser for her helpful commentary on the various drafts of this
Essay.
1. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
2. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (finding constitutional against due process chal-
lenge a state law criminalizzing same-sex sodomy).
3. Romer concluded that Amendment 2 violated the Equal Protection
Clause. 116 S. Ct. at 1629. See infra note 16 for the language of Amendment 2.
4. Examples might include consensual adult sexual activity, such as sod-
omy, or unconventional marriage arrangements, such as polygamy, same-sex
marriage, or miscegenation. This is to be distinguished from conduct that is
thought to cause harm for reasons other than just its supposed immorality.
For example, abortion restrictions may express moral disapproval of the act of
terminating fetal life, but the latter aspect of the conduct means that such re-
strictions necessarily implicate a "preventing harm to others" rationale.
Throughout this Essay I confine my use of the term "moral disapproval" to
state interests that do not include any "preventing harm to others" compo-
nent; thus abortion restrictions do not provide an example of the expression of
moral disapproval so defined.
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criminalization of one form of adult, private, consensual sexual
activity.' However, the Romer Court discounted an analogous
moral justification, identifying (impermissible) "animus,"
rather than (arguably permissible) moral disapproval, as the
motivating force behind Amendment 2. Thus one might infer
from the decision that there is now a "gay-friendly" majority on
the Court, a majority that might be inclined to credit argu-
ments that every anti-gay measure is motivated by constitu-
tionally impermissible bias and hostility.
Indeed, some speculate that Romer may signal a prelimi-
nary move by the Court in the direction of suspect-class status
for homosexuality, 6 which in turn could lead to the invalidation
of other measures disadvantaging gays and lesbians, such as,
most notably, bans on same-sex marriage. This line of specu-
lation is fueled in large measure by the fact that the Romer
majority opted not to rely on the "discriminatorily restructuring
the political process" rationale that had provided the basis for
a similar result in the Colorado Supreme Court.7 Instead, the
Court held that Amendment 2 failed equal protection rational
basis review. This choice is remarkable in at least three respects.
First, the majority selected an approach that seemingly re-
quires more, rather than less, judicial involvement with con-
troversial value choices. Second, the chosen rationale has
much greater potential applicability to issues of lesbian and
gay rights than the alternative approach, suggesting that the
Court can anticipate having to resolve similarly value-laden
questions in the future. Third, as noted above, the majority
characterized the ultimate driving force behind Amendment 2
as constitutionally impermissible animus, rather than moral
disapproval, and so held that it failed rational basis review.
A distinction between animosity and moral disapproval
thus lies at the heart of the Romer opinion, though it makes a
5. 478 U.S. at 196. Hardwick was decided as an as-applied challenge;
the Court did not address the question whether Georgia's sodomy law was
constitutional as applied to cases in which the sexual partners were of the op-
posite sex. Id. at 188 n.2.
6. The conclusion that anti-gay measures generally are the product of
prejudice and hostility might be a precursor to suspect-class status for homo-
sexuality. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOcRAcY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW 162-64 & 255-56 n.92 (1980).
7. Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1341 & n4 (Colo. 1994). It might be
said that the Romer opinion subsumes a variant of the "discriminatory re-
structuring" approach under the rational basis heading. These analyses are
described more fully infra at text accompanying notes 33-41.
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silent appearance, discernible only by inference from prece-
dents upon which the Court does, and does not, rely. The
proposition that animosity is not a legitimate state interest
represents an unexceptionable reading of earlier equal protection
decisions.8 At the same time, there are two arguably relevant
due process precedents not mentioned by the Romer majority:
Bowers v. Hardwick,9 which might be read to state the general
proposition that legislation rationally may be justified by the
state's pursuit of moral objectives, and Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,10 which contains hints
that some members of the Romer majority might yet be recep-
tive in some circumstances to a state's asserted moral justifi-
cations. 1 If one takes these precedents seriously, it becomes
crucial to determine whether animus or moral disapproval was
the actual motivating force behind Amendment 2 in particular,
or, more generally, behind the proscription of any "victimless"
private conduct.
The distinction between moral disapproval and animus
may be less than obvious. Consider this illustration: My part-
ner and I (a lesbian couple) are planning to host a party for a
number of our friends and acquaintances. In Scenario A, we
decide not to invite the Straights (a heterosexual couple) be-
cause we morally disapprove of their lifestyle (though not of
them personally), and we want our party to reflect our moral
community. In Scenario B, we decide not to invite the
Straights because we don't like them (because they are hetero-
sexuals) and, on account of this dislike, want to hurt their
feelings. Scenario A illustrates moral disapproval; Scenario B
illustrates animus.
At the level of state regulation of private conduct, same-
sex marriage seems a particularly good arena in which to ex-
plore the distinction between moral disapproval and animosity.
Last year Congress passed, and President Clinton signed, the
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which purports to permit
states not to give full faith and credit to same-sex marriages
recognized in another state.12 The debate on this measure fea-
tured comments such as:
8. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432,
448 (1985); Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
9. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
10. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
11. See infra text accompanying notes 55-60.
12. See Pub. L. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996). The constitutionality of
1998]
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What is at stake in this controversy? Nothing less than our col-
lective moral understandings-as expressed in the law-of the es-
sential nature of the family-the fundamental building block of soci-
ety. This is far from a trivial political issue. Families are not merely
constructs of outdated convention, and traditional marriage laws
were not based on animosity toward homosexuals. Rather, I believe
that the traditional family structure-centered on a lawful union be-
tween one man and one woman--comports with nature and with our
Judeo-Christian moral tradition. It is one of the essential founda-
tions on which our civilization is based.
13
That is, opponents of same-sex marriage disavow Scenario B,
contending that a ban would be motivated, and justified, by the
kind of reasoning illustrated by Scenario A.
On the most progressive reading of Romer, one could argue
that even under rational basis review a state proscription of
same-sex marriage would be constitutionally impermissible be-
cause motivated by animosity towards homosexuals. However,
same-sex marriage might well be the setting in which the
Court, or at least some members of the Romer majority, would
characterize the state's objective as moral disapproval rather
than hostility. If so, the Court would then confront the ques-
tions left unresolved in Romer: whether moral disapproval is a
"legitimate" (or "important" or "compelling")14 state interest
under equal protection analysis, and what to make of the due
process precedents that address analogous questions.
DOMA is not obvious; it is not at all clear that Article IV, Section 1 of the fed-
eral Constitution grants Congress the power to create exceptions to the Full
Faith and Credit Clause. That provision reads: "Full Faith and Credit shall
be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of
every other State; And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Man-
ner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Ef-
fect thereof." U.S. CONST. art IV, § 1. Authority for passage of DOMA, if it
exists at all, is to be found in the phrase "the Effect thereof."
13. 142 CONG. REC. H7441 (daily ed. July 11, 1996) (statement of Rep.
Canady).
14. Supreme Court precedents seemingly recognize three levels of judicial
review: rational basis review, captured by the requirement that legislation
bear "a rational relation to a legitimate state interest"; intermediate scrutiny,
encapsulated in the formula "a substantial relation to an important state in-
terest"; and strict scrutiny, which requires "a necessary relation to a compel-
ling state interest." They are progressively less deferential and accordingly
more difficult to satisfy. There may be a recent trend away from the distinc-
tion between intermediate and strict scrutiny. See Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) ("[W]e wish to dispel the notion that
strict scrutiny is 'strict in theory but fatal in fact.'! ); United States v. Vir-
ginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2271 (1996) (stating that sex classifications require
"exceedingly persuasive justification").
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This Essay explores the problem of moral disapproval as a
constitutionally adequate state interest through the lenses of
Romer v. Evans and same-sex marriage. I argue that expanding
the Romer majority's emerging insight regarding the hostile
nature of anti-gay legislation need not lead ineluctably to the
proposition that government never may take action motivated
by a moral vision, nor, more narrowly, to wholesale overruling
of seemingly related precedent such as Hardwick. Moreover, I
contend that the lodestar of the Equal Protection Clause lies in
a direction quite distinct from that of the Due Process Clause,
so that the status of government's asserted moral interests is
quite different with respect to those two constitutional provi-
sions. Indeed, the pluralist values underlying equal protection
impel the doctrinal conclusion that a moral purpose alone cannot
satisfy the requirements even of rational basis review. Accord-
ingly, a ban on same-sex marriage ought not to survive an
equal protection challenge even if it would satisfy the require-
ments imposed by the Due Process Clause.
In Part I of this Essay, I describe the principal rationale set
forth by the litigants who challenged Amendment 2, explain why
it is noteworthy that the Court opted not to settle on that pro-
posed line of analysis, and analyze the Romer opinion as actu-
ally written. In Part H, I examine the problem of state interests in
expressing moral disapproval, propose an approach to that
problem that I think is mandated by underlying equal protection
values, and apply that proposal to the question of same-sex
marriage.
I. INTERPRETING ROMER
Colorado's Amendment 2 was passed in 1992 by statewide
referendum, in reaction to the adoption of several local ordi-
nances prohibiting discrimination on the basis of homosexuality.15
Amendment 2 repealed all such existing antidiscrimination
laws, and in addition precluded enactment or enforcement of
similar laws in the future. 16 Had Amendment 2 taken effect,
15. See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1623 (1996).
16. Amendment 2 provided:
No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian, or Bisexual Ori-
entation. Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches
or departments, nor any of its agencies, political subdivisions, mu-
nicipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce any stat-
ute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or
bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall consti-
tute or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or class of per-
1998]
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lesbians and gay men seeking legal protection against dis-
crimination on the basis of homosexuality could have accom-
plished their goals only via a state constitutional amendment.
17
The plaintiffs challenging Amendment 2 rested primarily
on the contention that it violated a fundamental right of equal
participation in the political process. 8 They relied on a series
of cases that had held it a denial of equal protection for gov-
ernment to restructure the political process in such a way that
particular groups were required to pursue their interests
though more arduous political routes than others had to nego-
tiate.19 For instance, in Hunter v. Erickson" the Court invali-
dated a scheme that effectively required proponents of "fair
housing" legislation-prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
race or religion-to submit their proposals both to the City
Council and to the citizenry at large, while all other measures
sons to have or claim any minority status, quota preferences, pro-
tected status or claim of discrimination. This Section of the Consti-
tution shall be in all respects self-executing.
Id.
17. See id. at 1627. Because the state trial court granted a preliminary
injunction staying enforcement of Amendment 2, which was later replaced by a
permanent injunction, the amendment never went into effect. See id. at 1624.
18. The plaintiffs challenging Amendment 2 on several state and federal
constitutional grounds sought and obtained a preliminary injunction against
its enforcement. That ruling was affirmed by the Colorado Supreme Court,
stating with respect to the merits that the right to participate equally in the
political process is a "fundamental right" triggering strict scrutiny. See Evans
v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1282 (Colo. 1993). On remand, the parties litigated
the question whether Amendment 2 was narrowly tailored to serve a compel-
ling state interest, and whether lesbians and gay men should be considered a
"suspect class" for equal protection purposes. The trial court ruled against
the challengers on the latter point, and they did not appeal that ruling. How-
ever, the trial court did conclude that each of Colorado's proffered interests
failed strict scrutiny, either because the interest itself was not compelling, or
because the means was not necessary to serve the interest in question, and so
permanently enjoined enforcement of Amendment 2. The Colorado Supreme
Court affirmed the permanent injunction, reiterating its conclusion that the
right to participate equally in the political process is a fundamental right, and
agreeing that the state's asserted interests were insufficient. See Evans v.
Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1341 & n.4 (Colo. 1994).
19. See, e.g., Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 393 (1969); Washington v.
Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 470 (1982). But cf James v.
Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (upholding state constitutional requirement
that public housing project be approved by electorate, partly on ground that
referendums were required for several other types of decisions); Gordon v.
Lance, 403 U.S. 1, 5, 7 (1971) (upholding referendum requirement for incur-
ring bonded indebtedness, partly on ground that the challenged legislation did
not disadvantage any identifiable group).
20. 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
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passed by the City Council were subject to popular review only
upon presentation of a petition signed by ten percent of the
electorate.21 Similarly, Washington v. Seattle School District
No. 11 considered a statewide initiative ("Initiative 350") that
had the effect of preventing local school districts from making
school assignments for racial reasons, but simultaneously pre-
served maximum flexibility for those districts in making as-
signment decisions on any other basis. Initiative 350 restruc-
tured the political process in that it resolved the question of
pupil assignment (and busing) for racial reasons at the state
level, while all other pupil assignment decisions remained local
ones.23 The Court held the legislation unconstitutional, on the
ground that it "subtly distort[ed] governmental processes in
such as way as to place special burdens on the ability of minor-
ity groups to achieve beneficial legislation."24
The political schemes invalidated in these cases exhibit
three features. First, each of them involved reallocation of a
single issue to a different level of government decisionmaking;
usually, authority for resolution of a particular issue was
moved from a relatively smaller to a relatively larger decision-
making base, making it more difficult and more costly for a
special interest minority to command the assent of a majority
of decisionmakers. Second, each invalidated scheme could be
2L See id. at 393. More precisely, most ordinances approved by the City
Council took effect 30 days ater passage unless 10% of the electorate signed a
referendum petition, but ordinances regulating "the use, sale, advertisement,
transfer, listing assignment, lease, sublease or financing of real property of
any kind or of any interest therein on the basis of race, color, religion, na-
tional origin or ancestry" became effective only if approved by a majority of
voters. 393 U.S. at 387, 390.
22. 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
23. The Initiative provided that "no school board... shall directly or indi-
rectly require any student to attend a school other than the school which is
geographically nearest or next nearest the student's place of residence.., and
which offers the course of study pursued by such student," but also set forth a
series of exceptions such as special education needs, and health and safety
hazards or obstacles, which effectively covered all reasons for assignment to a
school other than the one nearest or next nearest a student's residence, except
racial balancing. See id. at 462-63.
24 Id. at 467.
25. The exception is Lee v. Nyquist, 318 F. Supp. 710 (W.D.N.Y. 1970),
affd mem., 402 U.S. 935 (1971), in which local elected (but not appointed)
school boards were permitted to retain decisionmaking authority; all other
race-related decisions were reserved for the state legislature. Id. at 712.
Even in this case, however, the effect of making "beneficial legislation" more
difficult for the minority to achieve is apparent.
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said to adversely impact an identifiable group of citizens.26 Fi-
nally, each of the cases in which the Court found a constitu-
tional violation implicated issues of race.
Amendment 2 clearly displayed the first two of these char-
acteristics, but not the third. Thus it presented the question
whether the "discriminatory restructuring" precedents depended
for their outcomes on the Court's identification of underlying
racial motivations. In essence, applying the "discriminatory
restructuring" precedents to Amendment 2 required the Court
to decide whether the former revolved around race discrimination
or around the restructuring per se. The Romer majority easily
could have taken the latter position. The "discriminatory re-
structuring" rationale appeals to a set of political process values
widely shared on the Court. Indeed, one of the most significant
modern justifications for judicial review concerns the role of
the Court in policing the integrity of the political process.28
From this perspective, heightened scrutiny would be appropri-
ate with regard to any distortion of the political process, in-
cluding claims of discriminatory restructuring. Had the Romer
Court taken this route it would not have been necessary to
reach the difficult question whether homosexuality is a suspect
classification for equal protection purposes; the same rationale
would apply whenever the political process was restructured in
a manner designed to disadvantage any identifiable group. 9
Moreover, the process values at stake here seem to justify a sui
26. In Hunter and Seattle School District No. 1, the Court identified racial
minorities as the group adversely affected by the challenged legislation. See
393 U.S. at 390-91; 458 U.S. at 472-73. In Gordon v. Lance, the Court upheld
the challenged legislation partly on the ground that it disadvantaged no iden-
tifiable group. See 403 U.S. 1, 5 (1971).
27. In addition to the impact on racial minorities noted above, Hunter and
Seattle School District No. 1 considered legislation that the Court identified as
having a racial subject. That characterization was obvious in Hunter, because
the challenged ordinance mentioned race on its face. See supra note 21.
However, in Seattle School District No. 1 the racial subject was apparent only
by omission; pupil assignments were permitted under Initiative 350 for all
usual reasons except racial ones. See supra note 23.
28. See the second paragraph of Carolene Products footnote four:
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which re-
stricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to
bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to
more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the
Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation.
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938); see also
ELY, supra note 6, at 73-104.
29. The issue of suspect class status for homosexuality was not presented
to the U.S. Supreme Court in Romer. See supra note 18.
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generis approach; it would have been equally unnecessary to
label the interest in political participation a "fundamental
right" as a predicate for heightened scrutiny."
However, the Romer majority eschewed heightened scru-
tiny altogether, opting instead to test the state's purpose and
means under the "rational basis" standard. One can only
speculate why this course was selected; perhaps the Justices
took to heart Colorado's contention that it would be formidably
difficult, if not impossible, to formulate a definition of the
"identifiable groups" whose participation in the political process
would be protected under some form of heightened scrutiny.
31
However, it is difficult to conclude that this or similar doctrinal
difficulties alone account for the decision of the Romer majority
to turn to a more traditional, broadly based rational basis
analysis, principally because the opinion brings into play value
choices that are not present under the "discriminatory restruc-
turing" approach. In the restructuring cases the Court seemed
to say that the distortion itself constituted the violation; there
is little analysis of the state's purposes even when a discrimi-
natory motive seems apparent. In contrast, the rational basis
approach leads the Romer Court to a more generalized exami-
nation of the state's motive in enacting Amendment 2, thus
replacing the arguably difficult matter of "identifiable groups"
with an equally difficult, and perhaps even more contentious,
problem: the identification of the state's purpose as animus or
moral disapproval.
Moreover, the Court's choice has the additional effect of
broadening considerably the potential field of application of the
Romer decision. The "discriminatory restructuring" analysis
applies only where a particular issue or closely related set of
issues is treated differently in the political process than are
analogous issues; as the relatively short line of precedent illus-
30. That is, I think the Colorado Supreme Court was correct in reading
the U.S. Supreme Court's earlier "discriminatory restructuring" decisions as
providing a basis for a right of equal political participation that would, if bur-
dened, trigger some form of heightened scrutiny, but I do not think it neces-
sary to label such a right "fmdamental"
31. See Reply Brief of Petitioners at *11-12, Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct.
1620 (1996), 1995 WL 466395 (No. 94-103). Other barriers to adopting the
"discriminatory restructuring" approach include the possibility that the ra-
tionale and holding of Hunter might not command a majority on today's Court,
and the conceivable perception of one or more Justices that it is problematic
for the Court to expand the list of "fundamental rights" (the argument ad-
vanced supra at note 30 and accompanying text notwithstanding).
1998] 841
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trates, such restructuring of the political process is relatively
rare. On the other hand, every government action that makes
some distinction among citizens is subject to the requirements
of equal protection, at least under the standard of rational basis
review.32 Thus the Court's turning to the broadly based ra-
tionality test is, at least at first glance, surprising on two
fronts: it opts for value-conscious review when a putatively
value-free analysis was available, and it seems to open the door
to additional value-sensitive constitutional challenges.
On closer examination, it appears in the Romer opinion
that Amendment 2 "fails, indeed defies" the conventional ra-
tional basis inquiry for two reasons.33 First, the Court says,
"the amendment has the peculiar property of imposing a broad
and undifferentiated disability on a single named group."34
Second, "the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but
animus toward the class that it affects." 35 The two points, the
Court says, are "related."36
The Court's first point is doctrinally elusive. In some re-
spects it appears similar to the "discriminatory restructuring"
approach described above:
It is not within our constitutional tradition to enact laws of this
sort. Central both to the idea of the rule of law and to our own Con-
stitution's guarantee of equal protection is the principle that govern-
ment and each of its parts remain open on impartial terms to all who
seek its assistance.... A law declaring that in general it shall be
more difficult for one group of citizens than for all others to seek aid
from the government is itself a denial of equal protection of the laws
in the most literal sense.37
Nevertheless, this is not equivalent to the "discriminatory re-
structuring" argument. First, shortly after citing the
"discriminatory restructuring" cases relied upon by the Colo-
rado Supreme Court, the Court stated that it was adopting a
different rationale,38 and indeed the relevant portion of the
Romer opinion does not cite the restructuring cases.39 Second,
the immediate context of the passage reproduced above is a
32. This point is recognized in Romer. 116 S. Ct. at 1627.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1628.
37. Id.
38. See id. at 1624.
39. See id. at 1627-29. Moreover, as noted above, Romer eschews height-
ened scrutiny.
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discussion of means-end "fit," or, more precisely, a discussion of
the disparity between the narrowness of the adversely affected
class and the breadth of the disabilities imposed.40 Thus it is
hard to determine whether it really is crucial to Justice Ken-
nedy's analysis that the disability concerns the political proc-
ess; he seems to be saying that any broad disability imposed on
a narrow class of citizens offends the guarantee of equal pro-
tection' Even if this line of analysis is intended to be a variant
of the "discriminatory restructuring" approach, it is one that
emphasizes the affected group over the reallocation itself, and
so seems to carry somewhat broader implications than would
an opinion written to follow more closely the lines set out in the
"discriminatory restructuring" precedents.
Two recent commentaries on Romer provide a more satis-
factory reading of the Court's first point: they contend that the
disparity between the narrowness of the affected class and the
breadth of disabilities imposed exposes Amendment 2 as an at-
tempt to render lesbians and gay men an "outlaw" caste in soci-
ety. Professor Amar locates the relevant constitutional value
in the Bill of Attainder Clause, arguing that "the sociology and
principles underlying the Attainder Clause powerfully illumi-
nate the facts of Romer, the opinions in Romer, and the spirit of
the Equal Protection Clause itself."42 Along similar lines, Pro-
fessors Farber and Sherry identify a constitutional "pariah
principle" (founded on the equal protection guarantee) that
prohibits government from "passing caste legislation: it cannot
create or sanction outcast groups."43 Under each of these
40. This passage begins with a reference to the equal protection require-
ment of means-end "fit": "[Eiven in the ordinary equal protection case calling
for the most deferential of standards, we insist on knowing the relation be-
tween the classification adopted and the object to be attained." Id. at 1627.
The opinion notes that the purpose of that inquiry is to "ensure that classifi-
cations are not drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened
by the law." Id. The Court then characterizes Amendment 2 as "at once too
narrow and too broad. It identifies persons by a single trait and then denies
them protection across the board." Id. at 1628. This is not a problem of
means-end fit, but a discussion of two aspects of the challenged means: the
classification and the particular consequences attached to it. This portion of
the opinion contains no discussion of the state's asserted purposes.
41. This line of argument was advanced in an amicus brief filed by Lau-
rence Tribe and other law professors. See Brief of Laurence H. Tribe et al.
passim, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996), 1995 WL 862021 (No. 94-1039).
42. Akbil Reed Amar, Attainder and Amendment 2: Romer's Rightness, 95
MIcH. L. REV. 203, 203-04 (1996).
43. Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The Pariah Principle, 13 CONsT.
COMMENTARY 257, 266-67 (1996).
1998]
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analyses, the key to this portion of the Romer majority's rea-
soning is to be found in Justice Kennedy's concluding statement
that a state "cannot... deem a class of persons a stranger to
its laws."' Amendment 2 fails because it renders homosexuals
"outlaws."
This "untouchability"" interpretation of Romer goes a long
way toward explaining the puzzles described earlier. First, the
problem of characterizing the state's purpose recedes almost into
irrelevance, because the prohibition against creating a class of
"untouchables" seems indifferent to the doctrinal distinction
between purpose and effects. Second, the "untouchability" in-
terpretation reads Romer as an even narrower decision than it
would have been had it been decided on the "discriminatory re-
structuring" rationale, because "untouchability" legislation is
quite rare. Thus this portion of the Romer opinion, though doc-
trinally opaque, is revealed as fundamentally well-conceived.
However, the Romer Court does not rest its decision ex-
clusively on the "untouchability" rationale, but goes on to make
a second point. The Court concludes that it can identify no
purpose behind the challenged law other than "animus," be-
cause of a different problem of "fit": there is no congruence at
all between the state's asserted purposes-respect for others'
freedom of association and the interest in conserving resources
to combat other forms of discrimination-and the chosen
means." There are relatively few rational basis review cases
on point, but this nevertheless is a well-established matter of
equal protection doctrine. The bare desire to harm a particular
class is not a legitimate state interest.47 Though this point is
described as "related" to the first-broadly construed, both in-
corporate notions of animus-the Court underscores the differ-
ence: "We conclude that, in addition to the far-reaching defi-
ciencies of Amendment 2 that we have noted, the principles it
offends, in another sense, are conventional and venerable; a
44. 116 S. Ct. at 1629.
45. See Amar, supra note 42, at 224; Farber & Sherry, supra note 43, at
266-67.
46. This portion of the Romer opinion follows an analysis set forth in the
Respondents' Brief, see Brief for Respondents at *22, Romer v. Evans, 116 S.
Ct. 1620 (1996), 1995 WL 370335 (No. 94-1039), and in an amicus brief filed by
Laurence H. Tribe, see Brief of Laurence H. Tribe et al. *4-6 (No. 94-1039).
47. In support of this proposition the Court cites Department of Agricul-
ture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973). See 116 S. Ct. at 1628. One could
cite City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985)
as well.
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law must bear a rational relationship to a legitimate govern-
mental purpose, and Amendment 2 does not."
41
If it is a "conventional and venerable" proposition that
animosity is not a legitimate state interest, it is not at all
equally clear precisely how the Romer majority came to iden-
tify that "purpose" as the impetus behind Amendment 2.
Moreover, the opinion fails to address the question whether
there is any constitutionally significant difference between a
state's asserted moral objectives and "a bare Congressional
desire to harm,"50 or, assuming that such a distinction can be
made out, what might be the status of the former under equal
protection analysis.51
The notion that moral disapproval is a constitutionally
permissible state interest under rational basis analysis, even
though animosity is not, has its roots in Bowers v. Hardwick.52
The question presented there was the constitutionality of a
state law criminalizing sodomy, as applied to conduct engaged
in by two persons of the same sex.53 The Court held first that
the individual interest at stake was not one that triggered
strict judicial scrutiny, and then concluded that the state's as-
serted moral purpose satisfied the requirements of rational
basis review.54 If rational basis analysis can be transposed
from the due process to an equal protection context (with re-
gard to moral purposes), Hardwick would seem to control.
Another recent due process decision provides a further
hint concerning the question of moral justification. In Planned
48. 116 S. Ct. at 1629 (citation omitted).
49. The "untouchability" interpretation of the first point treats Amend-
ment 2 as something distinct from less drastic measures that rest on simple
animosity. See Farber & Sherry, supra note 43, at 283 ("[T]he [pariah] prin-
ciple is somewhat different from Cleburne's amorphous concern with malig-
nant legislative intent."). Thus that portion of the opinion bears no immediate
relevance to the present inquiry regarding the distinction between animosity
and moral disapproval. However, to the extent we take the lesson of Romer to
be one solely having to do with the creation of a class of "untouchables," we
subtly normalize simpler forms of societal animus. A fortiori, this interpreta-
tion reinforces the message sent by due process precedents that expressing
moral disapproval is a permissible state interest.
50. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534.
51. Of course, the last point would not have been presented in Romer
even had the Court explained how it reached the conclusion that animosity,
rather than moral disapproval, lay behind Amendment 2.
52. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
53. See id. at 188 & n.2.
54. See id. at 196. Only one member of the Romer majority, Justice
O'Connor, had joined the opinion of the Court in Hardwick.
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Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,55 a plurality,
composed of three members of the Romer majority,56 applied an
unspecified level of review to pre-viability restrictions on abor-
tion, and indicated that a state interest in persuading a woman
to choose childbirth rather than abortion could satisfy that
standard of review." While this state interest is intimately
tied to the interest in protecting fetal life, and so falls within
the "preventing harm to others" category of state interests, 8
the plurality's recognition of this interest provides a clue re-
garding their receptivity to states' asserted moral purposes.
The joint opinion states:
Regulations which do no more than create a structural mecha-
nism by which the State, or the parent or guardian of a minor, may
express profound respect for the life of the unborn are permitted, if
they are not a substantial obstacle to the woman's exercise of the
right to choose.... Unless it has that effect on her right of choice, a
state measure designed to persuade her to choose childbirth over
abortion will be upheld if reasonably related to that goal. 9
Because the objective of protecting fetal life would be more ef-
fectively vindicated by measures that do impose substantial
obstacles (not to mention outright prohibitions), one has to
conclude that the emphasis here is more on the woman's state
of mind, or perhaps the symbolic message sent by the state,
than on fetal life per se. To this extent, the plurality appears
to recognize an interest that is partially independent of a
"preventing harm to others" rationale; in the context of an is-
sue as heavily laden with moral connotations as abortion, ° this
approach suggests that the members of the Casey plurality
may be more receptive to a state's asserted moral interests
than their position in Romer otherwise might indicate.
Thus, the juxtaposition of Bowers and Casey, on the one hand,
with Romer (along with Moreno and Cleburne) on the other,
strongly suggests that moral disapproval enjoys quite a differ-
ent constitutional status than does governmental animosity.
However, the Court has yet to address this distinction, or to
55. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
56. These are Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter.
57. See 505 U.S. at 878.
58. See supra note 4.
59. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877-78 (plurality opinion).
60. Indeed, in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490
(1989), Justice Stevens argued that the state's interest in fetal life has not
only a moral, but a religious foundation. See id. at 563-70 (Stevens, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part).
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engage the problem of the status of governmental moral pur-
poses under the doctrinal heading of equal protection review.
61
Potential state prohibitions against same-sex marriage would
provide one circumstance-the one looming most immediately
on the horizon-in which to test and apply the distinction be-
tween moral disapproval and animosity.
H. SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
The question whether there is a constitutionally signifi-
cant difference between animosity and moral disapproval
comes into sharp focus when one considers the question of
same-sex marriage. A state might respond to an equal protection
challenge to a prohibition against same-sex marriages by di-
rectly asserting an interest in moral disapproval of homo-
sexuality, or by doing the same indirectly, say by claiming an
interest in preserving the "traditional family." Doctrinally,
three issues present themselves: the applicable level of scru-
tiny, the question whether due process precedents apply, and,
if not, how to fashion a distinct equal protection analysis. The
last question subdivides into two: whether there is a meaningful
distinction to be drawn between animosity and moral disap-
proval for equal protection purposes, and if so, whether moral
disapproval is a legitimate state interest.
Under equal protection analysis, heightened scrutiny
would be in order if a prohibition against same-sex marriage
were characterized by the Court as sex discrimination. 62 However,
this is something the state courts generally have been unwill-
ing to do;63 if the Supreme Court follows suit, the ban would be
subject to rational basis review.64 I proceed on that assumption.
61. In Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), and Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S.
297 (1980), the Court addressed equal protection challenges to abortion find-
ing restrictions, and concluded that the state's interest in protecting fetal life
was sufficient under rational basis review. See 432 U.S. at 478; 448 U.S. at
324. However, abortion restrictions do not express pure moral disapproval as
defined for purposes of this Essay. See supra note 4.
62. The argument is that a prohibition on same sex-marriage is sex dis-
crimination because it permits a man but not a woman to marry a woman,
and permits a woman but not a man to marry a man. An exactly analogous
argument led to the conclusion that a miscegenation statute constituted race
discrimination in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
63. See Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Miun. 1971), appeal dismissed,
409 U.S. 810 (1972); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App.), review
denied, 84 Wash. 2d 1008 (1974). However, a sex discrimination claim also
may be premised on state law; in Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993),
the Hawaii Supreme Court concluded that a ban on same-sex marriage consti-
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Cass Sunstein has addressed, and in my view, laid to rest,
the argument that due process precedents should control equal
protection analysis across the board. Sunstein points out that
the Due Process Clause often has been interpreted to protect
society's traditional values; accordingly its point of reference is
taken to be the common law, Anglo-American practice, or the
status quo. 6 For example, in Griswold v. Connecticut,67 the
first of the modern "substantive" due process cases, Justice
Goldberg looked to the "traditions and (collective) conscience of
our people" to determine whether the right at stake was to be
deemed "fundamental."68 In Moore v. East Cleveland,69 Justice
Powell characterized fundamental liberties as those that are
"deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."70
In contrast, Sunstein notes, the values driving equal pro-
tection interpretation are quite different. The Equal Protection
Clause was "self-consciously designed to eliminate practices
that existed at the time of ratification and that were expected
tutes sex discrimination and is subject to strict scrutiny under the state con-
stitution's equal protection clause. See id. at 68.
64. It seems likely that a ban on same-sex marriage would not survive
heightened scrutiny, which would be the applicable standard if the ban were
viewed as sex discrimination. At present, it is not clear precisely which sort of
heightened review applies to legislation that discriminates on the basis of sex.
See supra note 14.
A ban on same-sex marriage also would be open to a due process chal-
lenge. If same-sex marriage were found to be a fimdamental interest, the
applicable standard would be strict scrutiny. (Of course, this approach likely
would fail if the Court accepted the definition of marriage as a union between
one man and one woman, rendering irrelevant precedents recognizing mar-
riage as a fundamental interest.) However, that line of argument is not under
examination here.
65. See Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note
on the Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. Cmu. L.
REV. 1161 (1988).
66. This is a generalization; of course, there are problems to be considered
in the application of tradition, and there are occasional exceptions to the gen-
eral approach. See id. at 1170-74.
67. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
68. Id at 493 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts,
291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
69. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
70. Id. at 503 (plurality opinion). The passages quoted from Moore and
Griswold have to do with the characterization of the individual interest at is-
sue in those cases. See 431 U.S. at 503; 381 U.S. at 492-93 (Goldberg, J., con-
curring). It is consistent with those analyses to conclude that state interests
too should be tested in due process cases by reference to society's traditional
values.
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to endure."71 The purpose of this clause is to protect socially
subordinated groups against discrimination by the majority.
Thus it is not only not driven by traditional values, it often
functions directly in opposition to tradition. This understanding
of equal protection explains sex discrimination doctrine, which
holds that a state may not justify treating women differently
than men by resting on a traditional vision of their respective
roles, capacities, or characteristics.
7 2
In a sense, then, the Due Process Clause is assimilationist,
while the Equal Protection Clause is pluralist.73 That is, due
process analysis will ratify practices that have the effect of re-
quiring conformity to society's traditional norms, and will in-
validate only measures that constitute departures from those
norms.74 On the other hand, equal protection analysis will do
the opposite-it will invalidate measures that require confor-
mity to norms of the dominant culture.75 It follows that the
role of moral justification is quite different under these two
constitutional provisions, especially when a proffered moral
purpose is one that looks to society's traditional values. When
an enactment is challenged as violating due process, a moral
objective may, at least in principle, pass constitutional muster.76
71. Sunstein, supra note 65, at 1174.
72. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (striking statutory prefer-
ence for male estate administrators); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973) (holding unconstitutional statute presuming that a female spouse was
dependent upon male service member, but requiring female service member
to prove dependency of male spouse); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498,
507-08 (1975) (explaining that statutes invalidated in Reed and Frontiero re-
flected "archaic and overbroad generalizations" about women and men).
73. The substantive component of due process is assimilationist to the
extent that it ratifies conformity to traditional values; assimilationism some-
times may have a broader meaning. See, e.g., Robert C. Post, Cultural Het-
erogeneity and Law: Pornography, Blasphemy, and the First Amendment, 76
CALIF. L. REV. 297, 299-300 (1988) (defining "assimilationist law" as law that
enforces conformity to the norms of a dominant group). By pluralism, I mean
cultural, rather than interest-group pluralism. See generally Gerald Torres,
Critical Race Theory: The Decline of the Universalist Ideal and the Hope of
Plural Justice-Some Observations and Questions of an Emerging Phenome-
non, 75 MINN. L. REV. 993 (1991); Kevin M. Fong, Comment, Cultural Plural-
ism, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 133 (1978).
74. For example, Hardwick ratified legislation that criminalized noncon-
formity to traditional sexual mores, see 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986), while Gris-
wold invalidated legislation that was perceived to deviate from traditional
norms, see 381 U.S. at 485-86.
75. Typically such legislation does so by disadvantaging those who are
different in some specified respect.
76. This is not to say that I think all of the due process cases are correctly
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But equal protection is diametrically different; at a minimum,
due process precedents regarding moral purposes carry no
weight in equal protection cases."
I arrive, then, at the issues that lie silently at the core of
Romer: whether there is a constitutionally significant differ-
ence between animus and moral disapproval, and if so,
whether moral disapproval ought to be deemed a legitimate
state interest for equal protection purposes. I conclude that
the equal protection guarantee forecloses recognition of any
such distinction, and thus there is no need to reach the latter
question. The analysis undertaken above, concerning the dif-
ferent orientations of the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses, provides guidance: pluralism is the lodestar of equal
protection.
Consider again the hypothetical situation described at the
beginning of this Essay. The difference between Scenario A-
in which I decline to invite the Straights because I morally dis-
approve of their heterosexual lifestyle-and Scenario B-in
which I omit them because I don't like them (as heterosexuals)
and I want to hurt their feelings-revolves entirely around my
intent. The effect is the same in either case: the Straights are
not invited to my party. Moreover, their feelings of exclusion
might well be the same in either case, whether they are or are
not aware of my reasons. So far, this is just to say that the
distinction between moral disapproval and animus goes solely
to intent, and not to effects.
Thus one way to frame the equal protection inquiry is to
ask whether this is a circumstance in which intent ought to be
dispositive. I cannot define my "moral community" (of lesbians
and gays) without excluding the Straights, and thus in life
ought not to be surprised if they feel badly about my decision,
whether or not they fully understand it. Can one conclude that
the harm to the Straights is the same regardless of my reason
for not inviting them? In one important sense it is: they are
excluded in either scenario, because they are not homosexual.
Variations in my state of mind seem relatively ephemeral com-
pared to the stark fact of exclusion. Indeed, the point becomes
decided; they present complicated issues of the level of generality at which the
relevant tradition is identified. See Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf,
Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057 (1990).
77. The converse is equally true: equal protection precedents should not
control due process cases.
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even stronger when one considers the exclusion of social
"outsiders."78
Even so, this does not fully make the case that the harm
inflicted by excluding a socially subordinate group because of
the dominant group's desire to constitute a moral community is
identical to the harm inflicted by exclusion because of animus,
nor that the respective harms ought to be so regarded as a
matter of constitutional law. Current equal protection doctrine
clearly endorses the proposition that government's intent matters
greatly.79 There is some appeal in the underlying reasoning:
injuries suffered as the byproducts of the state's pursuit of oth-
erwise legitimate interests are categorically different from be-
ing the object of government's "bare desire to inflict harm," be-
cause the latter sets one out as undeserving of even minimal
human respect. That argument returns us to the question
whether moral disapproval of "outsiders" is the sort of legiti-
mate state interest whose exclusionary byproducts ought to be
tolerated as a matter of equal protection.
It is here that the notion of equality as pluralism provides
a final answer. State action undertaken for moral reasons
alone is the antithesis of pluralism; it evinces no respect for the
moral understanding or norms of those whom it situates as
outsiders. Thus, if the Equal Protection Clause is fundamen-
tally pluralist, moral disapproval cannot be distinguished from
animus because both reflect an absence of moral respect. It
follows that government rationales ostensibly based exclusively
on moral disapproval, like rationales that reflect hostility,
ought never to withstand equal protection scrutiny, even under
the rational basis standard.
In a sense, then, that which is "moral disapproval" in the
due process context becomes "animus" in the equal protection
context, because of the different directions in which the two
provisions point. Pluralist values protect moral diversity just
as they protect diversity in its other dimensions.8 0 This under-
78. See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protec-
tion: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 319-20
(1987); Theodore Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theo-
ries of Constitutional Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 36 (1977).
79. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976) ("[Ihe invidious
quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be
traced to a discriminatory purpose.").
80. For example, equality principles protect cultural diversity. See BARBARA
J. FLAGG, WAS BLIND, BUT Now I SEE: WHITE RACE CONSCIOUSNEsS AND THE
LAW (1998).
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standing of equality may explain the remaining mystery of
Romer: why the majority found it unnecessary to explain how
they came to the conclusion that animus, rather than moral
disapproval, motivated Amendment 2.
This is not to say that the state may not act to protect itself,
or that it always must acquiesce to conduct a majority of its
members find morally reprehensible. Most such conduct can
be regulated because of other objectives, such as preventing
harm to others. 81 For example, adults' sexual activity with mi-
nors might be proscribed on the ground that the inherent
power imbalance renders such contact harmful per se to the
child.82 That such regulation might have a disparate impact on
"outsider" groups83 is, of course, not a constitutional infirmity.
The point here is only that a moral position alone ought not to
constitute a "legitimate" state interest for the purpose of equal
protection review.
The question of a state's prohibition of same-sex marriage is
subject to the same analysis. Assuming that a state can advance
no credible "harm to others" justification for such a ban, but
rests solely on a moral claim, the ban ought not to survive
equal protection review even under the rational basis stan-
dard. Allowing the state to impose the majority's moral vision
on a small percentage of the population who wish to select a
person of the same sex as life partner is inconsistent with the
pluralist character of the equal protection guarantee.
Just as the due process precedents do not control this
question, the suggested perspective on equal protection-that
moral purposes, standing alone, cannot constitute "legitimate"
state interests-would not control due process analysis. Doc-
trinally, it is appropriate to conclude that moral objectives may
satisfy the rational basis standard under due process review.
It is not unusual to find that a state enactment that violates
one constitutional provision is nevertheless consistent with an-
other.84 More generally, the state may pursue moral objectives,
at least if they conform to society's traditional values. It just
may not pursue those objectives by treating some citizens dif-
81. As noted earlier, this analysis can explain the equal protection abor-
tion funding precedents. See supra note 61.
82. One can advance a similar argument with respect to incest.
83. The group in question is pedophiles, who are sometimes and quite in-
correctly categorized together with gay men.
84. See Sunstein, supra note 65, at 1165-70.
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ferently from others; the Equal Protection Clause is primarily
concerned with classifications, rather than individual interests.85
Thus a ban on same-sex marriage ought to fail equal pro-
tection review even if the Court concludes that such a ban does
not constitute sex discrimination. The prohibition would single
out persons who wish to marry someone of the same sex, dis-
advantaging that group relative to those who wish to marry
someone of the opposite sex. The state's asserted moral pur-
pose, whether couched in terms of traditional family values or
moral disapproval of homosexuality, ought not to provide a
constitutionally adequate justification for the chosen means-
denying one group the benefits of a legal status that the major-
ity enjoys.
CONCLUSION
I have argued that the Court in Romer v. Evans made sev-
eral remarkable doctrinal moves on the path to invalidating
Colorado's Amendment 2, moves that might lead gay rights ad-
vocates to anticipate continuing victories in constitutional liti-
gation, for instance with regard to the question of same-sex
marriage. While that assessment ultimately may prove cor-
rect, one should not read Romer too broadly. The Romer opin-
ion leaves untouched a matter most crucial to gay rights is-
sues: the status in constitutional analysis of states' asserted
interests in expressing moral disapproval. Moreover, there is
in place at least one constitutional precedent that seemingly
limits the reach of the insights that Romer does represent.
However, I contend that because the Due Process Clause
and the Equal Protection Clause face in fundamentally differ-
ent directions-the former is assimilationist, the latter plural-
ist-due process precedents regarding government's moral ob-
jectives are of no significance to equal protection analysis.
Moreover, the pluralist values that ground the equal protection
guarantee mandate a doctrine that moral purposes alone never
satisfy equal protection review, even under the most deferen-
tial standard, the rational basis test.
85. Even the fundamental interests branch of equal protection turns ul-
timately on the presence of a classificatory mechanism; it protects interests
that are not afforded independent constitutional protection. But cf San An-
tonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973)(contending that equal protection fundamental rights cases recognized only
rights "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution").
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This proposition, that moral disapproval alone ought not to
be deemed a legitimate state interest for equal protection pur-
poses, would explain the Romer majority's failure to explore
the distinction between animosity and moral disapproval: each
motive violates the principle of pluralism that is the heart and
soul of the guarantee of equal protection. In the final analysis,
perhaps Romer does signal the beginning of a new era of
equality for lesbians and gay men.
